Geopolitical diary: India's invisible war footing

Geopolitical diary: India's invisible war footing

India on Thursday placed a key paramilitary organization, the Border Security Force (BSF), on high alert. Though there have been vague reports that Indian military forces have been on high alert since the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai, the BSF move is the closest we have come to seeing actual Indian preparations for war. And frankly, it is not very close. The BSF, which currently has 45,000 personnel deployed along the 2,030-mile border with Pakistan and also guards the border with Bangladesh, would not be involved in any major combat operations with Pakistan; its mandate is to prevent infiltration, not to carry out attacks. Indeed, more than three weeks after the Mumbai attacks, there has been nothing even remotely resembling the military buildup that occurred in the wake of the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, when New Delhi deployed 750,000 troops in Kashmir within a week. Until now, we have seen New Delhi threaten to take action, and we have seen it join hands with the United States in pressuring Pakistan to take action against the various actors involved in the attacks, but there has been nothing measurable that could be convincingly described as preparation for a war. Given this stark contrast between the two situations, conventional wisdom would suggest that the clouds of war that were hovering over South Asia might have passed. A recent flurry of statements from very senior Indian officials, saying that they are not planning an attack against Pakistan, might make the conventionally wise feel even more at ease. Stratfor has learned, however, that Indian military operations against targets in Pakistan have in fact been prepared and await the signal to go forward. These most likely would take the form of unilateral precision strikes inside Pakistan-administer ed Kashmir, along with special forces action on the ground in Pakistan proper. Unlike the massive troop movements in 2002, these are not the type of operations for which preparations would be visible to the world at large. Sources have indicated to Stratfor that New Delhi is going through the diplomatic motions in order to give Pakistan the opportunity to take care of the militant problem itself —- but the Indians know that Islamabad has neither the will nor the capability to address their concerns. From a strategic perspective, the Indian government can no more afford to accept the Mumbai attacks and move forward than the U.S. government could have afforded to ignore the 9/11 attacks. New Delhi has little choice but to respond -— regardless of which political party is in power -— and because the perpetrators are linked to elements within the Pakistani state, the response must be directed against Pakistan. And if Islamabad will not cooperate in controlling the militants, India will have to take unilateral action. The Indians know that striking in Pakistan would not eliminate the Islamist threat —- but that would not be the aim of any such operation. Instead, India has to communicate firmly that it will no longer tolerate attacks from Pakistan-based militants —- whether they are rogue or approved by the state. Failure to do so risks emboldening the Islamists and their enablers, as well as a domestic political backlash. The Indian government could not live with either of those outcomes. The Pakistanis, for their part, also are showing subtle signs that they see India as likely to act. Pakistani daily The News reported Thursday that former President Pervez Musharraf had been forced to leave the country after security forces unearthed an assassination plot against him. Reports like this do not simply appear in the Pakistani press; they are carefully leaked in efforts to shape perceptions and behavior. In this case, the Pakistani army's central command is signaling to the Indians that the situation has spun so far out of its control that the safety of its own VIPs cannot be guaranteed. The underlying message is that any Indian plans for striking Pakistan will further weaken the tenuous writ of the Pakistani state, exacerbating rather than neutralizing the militant threat to India. It is not a very strong argument, and certainly not one the Pakistanis would be making if they did not think an Indian military action was in the works —- but Islamabad does not have many options left.